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GRESSION, REGRESSION, AND BEYOND: 
A Cognitive Reading of The Unnamable 
 
 
Marco Bernini 
 
 
This article provides a reading of The Unnamable in the light of contemporary 
cognitive theories of self and self-consciousness. By drawing on Daniel 
Dennett’s account of self as a ‘centre of narrative gravity’ and on the three-
levels model of self proposed by Antonio Damasio, the article foregrounds 
significant analogies with Beckett’s literary journey into cognition, even 
before and beyond The Unnamable. It concludes by arguing that a cognitive 
approach to his narrative work can offer a framework for interpreting the 
extent to which Beckett has been able to explore the mind, generating through 
language and narrative devices experiences which sciences can only 
discursively report. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: A Cognitive Journey 
It is fairly odd discovering, in a letter to Georges Duthuit at the very 
beginning of June 1949 – only two months after having started to draft 
The Unnamable, in one of the gloomiest periods of his creative career – 
that Beckett was “reading Around the World in 80 Days,” positively 
classified as “lively stuff” (LSB II, 163). Given the descending, 
excavating nature of the last novel of the trilogy, it would have been 
less surprising to find a mention of the equally famous masterpiece by 
Verne, the Voyage au centre de la Terre (1864). Yet, in a less local 
scrutiny, both the horizontal, superficial (and significantly circular) 
orbit of Phileas Fogg’s enterprise, and the vertical, geologically 
stratified axis of Professor Lidenbrok’s quest are present in Beckett’s 
narrative work. However, these two movements are not simultaneously 
operative, but rather are subsequently exploited throughout Beckett’s 
narrative trajectory. As Mark Nixon elucidates, sometime after Murphy 
there is a turning point in how the trope of the journey is treated in 
Beckett’s fiction, since Beckett has accepted “that there was no ‘to’ or 
‘towards’, and thus no redemptive destination” (191). The horizontal 
pointless excursions of Belacqua across Irish cityscapes or Murphy’s 
wandering in the outer world of London progressively come to an end 
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in the trilogy – passing, as Shane Weller argues, from the “object-world 
or subject-world” of Murphy to the “flight from all world” in Malone 
meurt (Weller, 109). This is not to say that the trope of the journey 
disappears from Beckett’s literary imagination. Rather, as Nixon 
indicates, it “remains central to Beckett’s postwar work, but is negated” 
(97) or, I would suggest, inverted (The Unnamable being “a kind of 
inverted spiral,” (Beckett 2009, 310)). The horizontal plane of 
movement is replaced by a vertical expedition, and Belacqua’s 
“gression” (Beckett 2010, 33) is substituted by an inward plunge, of 
which The Unnamable constitutes the endless bottom. In this narrative 
manoeuvre, a different ‘towardness’ emerges, for Beckett understands, 
as we shall see, that the outward journey in search of the self is the 
“wrong figure” (qtd. in Knowlson, 247). An alternative exploration has 
to be directed on the way to what he calls the “seed of motion” (247) by 
going beyond what is called in Molloy “the surface leaden above the 
infernal depths” (Beckett 2009, 73) of the mind from which the illusion 
of selfhood stems. 
 In the present article, I want to account for this second 
speleological journey in Beckett’s fictional work by drawing on 
contemporary cognitive theories of self. On the one hand, I want to 
suggest that, in The Unnamable, Beckett does indeed reach some kind 
of centre of the subjective planet, the structure and functions of which 
resemble those qualities that the philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett 
attributes to what he calls the “center of narrative gravity” (1991, 418). 
This parallel should enrich the interpretation of the outcome of this 
expedition, with the discovery that the feeling of a seed of (narrative) 
motion is a false sensory impression responsible for the “stupid 
obsession with depth” (Beckett 2009, 287), which in turn accounts for 
the conception and perception of the self as an internal locus of 
subjectivity. Furthermore, I put this narrative account of the self into 
relation with two distinct problems related to self-consciousness: 
namely, the problems of circularity and of infinite regress. As we shall 
see, The Unnamable can be read as a fictional rendering of these two 
complications indissolubly bounded to an ontology of self-knowledge. 
On the other hand, I elaborate on the remarkable similarities between 
the three-levels model of self proposed by the neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio (2010), and the distinct cognitive levels that the narrator of 
The Unnamable lets the reader perceive, especially by pointing beyond 
its linguistic existence. In a letter to Aidan Higgins in 1952, Beckett 
wrote about The Unnamable as “the end of the jaunt,” going further by 
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saying that “I used to think all [t]his work was an effort, necessarily 
feeble, to express the nothing. It seems rather to have been a journey, 
irreversible, in gathering thinglessness, towards it. Or also. Or ergo. 
And the problem remains entire or at last arising ends” (LSB II, 319). A 
cognitive reading of the novel can provide a new interpretive 
framework for the entwined “also” and “ergo” of what Beckett found at 
the (provisory) end of his tour into, to quote Molloy, “the laws of the 
mind” (9).  
 Methodologically speaking, the present reading might risk falling 
within what H. Porter Abbott criticizes as an “interpretation by 
circularity,” where (here replacing philosophy with cognitive science) 
the argumentation consists of “a happy matching of fictional content to 
philosophical idea, with its implicit relegation of fiction to a second-
order discipline in which philosophy is the master and fiction the 
handmaiden” (2008, 81). In fact quite the opposite is the case. Rather 
than assigning to Beckett’s fiction an ancillary role as a narrative 
mirroring of a cognitive problem, I want to venture the idea that fiction 
has a specific exploratory and epistemic potential, a potential that 
Beckett explores. Additionally, fiction has an explanatory advantage 
over science, for it can avoid discursive or metaphorical descriptions by 
delivering, as Abbott suggests elsewhere, an “immediate experience of 
a variety of mysteries” through “a generation in the reader of 
experiences” (1973, 103). This exploration and generation of 
experience is what I argue Beckett attends to in The Unnamable by 
tackling the mystery of the self. Within Beckett studies, the article is 
intended to offer a contribution to the increasing interest in Beckett and 
the mind (see Barry1). More specifically, it could be regarded as 
complementary to studies such as the analysis by David Hesla on 
Beckett and consciousness – who first brought attention to the regress 
problem in The Unnamable (183) – or the work Matthew Feldman has 
conducted on Beckett and phenomenology, in which Feldman 
persuasively reads Beckett’s fiction after Watt as a “phenomenological 
rendering of intellection” (2009, 14).  
 
 
2. ‘Things in Terms of Boxes’: Theories of Self, and the Centre of 
Narrative Gravity 
Despite the fact that the concept of self is still feeding “a tradition of 
disagreements” (Gallagher 2012) within the study of the mind, 
cognitive sciences have unanimously challenged this foundational 
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belief. The most radical trend is constituted by cognitive scientists such 
as Tomas Metzinger or Dennett supporting an ‘eliminativist’ position 
which dismisses the self as a representational illusion, since “no such 
things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self” 
(Metzinger, 1). Alternatively, phenomenologists such as Shaun 
Gallagher, or neuroscientists such as Damasio claim that we should 
rather distinguish between different levels of self. Even if with such 
significant differences, all of these approaches agree that the self does 
not have a place within us, that there are no traces of an homunculus or 
an observer in our mind – something like the little man in the head 
Beckett sketched in this doodle on a manuscript of The Unnamable.  
 
 
This sketch invites a further consideration about how biological 
truths are often counterintuitive to phenomenological perceptions and 
expectations. Without taking a stand in the abiding controversy 
Due to copyright 
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opposing a “Cartesian Beckett” to an anti-dualistic author,2 I think this 
doodle is particularly telling because it suggests that Beckett was 
reflecting upon the widespread human tendency to portray the self as an 
internally located agent. Naturally, this does not mean Beckett believed 
in his existence. On the contrary, he struggled with the fact that 
although Descartes can be discredited as biologically wrong, he has 
never ceased to be phenomenologically persuasive (or even 
commonsensical). There seems to exist what Dennett famously labeled 
as a “Cartesian theatre,” in which the self as a spectator or “‘master’ 
discriminator” (1991, 113) witnesses the stream of images and the ever 
flowing words of inner speech projected onto the screen. And in this 
scribble, what from the outside look like wrinkles in the forehead of a 
distinguished gentleman, from the inside perspective of the homunculus 
in his head can be seen as a cascade of (written?) words he is 
interpreting or  – appropriately for the constitutive role of narration I 
am about to introduce – producing. This spatial conception of the self is 
a way of thinking about cognition Beckett was investigating also in 
terms of personal imaginative attitudes, as confirmed by a letter to 
Duthuit sent three weeks before beginning The Unnamable in which he 
expresses the realization that it is “odd I always see things in terms of 
boxes” (LSB II, 129). Once again, this does not allow us to conclude 
that Beckett embraced this internal cognitive topography of the mind 
and the self. I think the doodle rather illustrates the kind of cognitive 
model – which we could describe as the ‘box model’ – that Beckett 
ultimately challenges in The Unnamable as a perceptual habit which 
has to be unmasked as a fallacy.  
 In fact, notwithstanding empirical evidence, the ‘box model’ is 
still prevalent as a perceptual account of self-consciousness, as when 
we refer in ordinary experience – and interestingly here, also in 
narrative analysis – to consciousness as a ‘point of view’, which is 
located somewhere in our head. But if we ask, as Dennett does, “where 
precisely in the brain that point of view is located, the simple 
assumptions that work so well on larger scales of space and time break 
down. It is now quite clear that there is no single point in the brain 
where all information funnels in, and this fact has some far from 
obvious consequences” (1992, 184). The mind acts as an observer, 
Dennett explains, only if we look from a distance at what it does, but if 
we look into the mind there is neither a single focal point of view, nor a 
single part of the brain functioning as an observer. Thus, the question is 
how do we distil a single, individual self from the multiple information 
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our mind processes. In other words, to paraphrase Damasio (2010), 
how does our self come to the mind? Dennett thinks narrative does the 
work, giving us the impression that there is a self where there is none. 
Telling stories about who we are, Dennett suggests, it is an 
evolutionary strategy we use to create, protect, and define our selves, 
just as spiders spin webs or beavers make dams: 
 
And just as spiders don’t have to think consciously and 
deliberately, about how to spin their webs, [...] we (unlike 
professional storytellers) do not consciously and deliberately 
figure out what narratives to tell and how to tell them. Our tales 
are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin them; they spin us. 
Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their 
product, not their source.  
These strings of narrative issue forth as if from a single 
source: [as if from] a center of narrative gravity.  
(1991, 418, emphasis in the original) 
 
The self is an inference we make from the stories that spin us. It is a 
conceptual centre we (and others) can posit for justifying the 
impression of unified agency that the self, as “attractor of properties” 
(418) and stories, elicits. Importantly, Dennett stresses that we do not 
have to be aware of our storytelling activity, and primarily we do not 
have to be conscious that we are actually building our self through it. 
Indeed we cannot access the fact that our self is a representation, an 
abstraction, much as the centre of gravity is for physics. This is what 
Tomas Metzinger refers to as the “autoepistemic closure” of self-
knowledge, which is “a structurally anchored deficit in the capacity to 
gain knowledge about oneself” (57). The representational nature of the 
self is not accessible through introspection due to what Metzinger calls 
a “phenomenal transparency,” and the degree of this transparency is 
inversely proportional to cognitive availability (165). In other words, 
the more we cannot attend to the construction process of a phenomenal 
state the more it is transparent to us. Professional storytellers instead, to 
expand on Dennett’s incidental remark, can consciously explore the 
representational nature of the self by increasing the opacity and 
foregrounding the wordy texture of this deception, as Beckett has 
masterfully done in his fictional journey to (and beyond) the centre of 
narrative gravity.  
 The idea of a transparency of the self, of an epistemic closure to 
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the centre of narrative gravity, is a necessary theoretical move if one is 
to avoid the epistemic problem of circularity, and the ontological side 
effect of an infinite regress of self-consciousness. The former is a sort 
of narratological conundrum. The story of our life, as Jerome Bruner 
points out, “is, of course, a privileged but troubled narrative in the 
sense that it is reflexive: the narrator and the central figure in the 
narrative are the same. This reflexivity creates dilemmas” (693). Thus, 
every time we want to reflectively inspect what we intend when we say 
‘I’ in our story, we face what José Luis Bermúdez calls a vicious 
“explanatory circularity,” which is a key aspect of the “paradox of self-
consciousness” because “the explanandum is part of the explanans” 
(16). Circularity is not the only reason to assume that our sense of self 
is generated through unconscious activity. If our sense of self were 
something we have to be conscious of through second reflective higher 
order mental states, “then these second-order mental states must also be 
taken as objects by occurrent third-order mental states, and so forth ad 
infinitum” (Zahavi, 24; emphasis in the original). Dennett, as we have 
seen, avoids the problem by saying that we do not have to be conscious 
of what we are doing while we are building our selves through 
storytelling. The centre of narrative gravity does not have a 
consciousness of itself; it can be allowed neither a reflective point of 
view nor a sense of agency, because it is solely an illusory effect of a 
storytelling activity. Nobody can access the centre of narrative gravity 
that everyone is.  
 Does this mean that we cannot speak of a self beyond words? This 
question could reasonably be elected as one of the most representative 
of Beckett’s major narratives, and the second notebook in which 
Beckett composed The Unnamable supports this ranking by having 
added precisely the interrogative phrase – as a sort of alternative title, 
as Carlton Lake tentatively inferred it to be – “Beyond Words?” (62). 
Cognitive sciences concede that, if not in the habitual meaning by 
which we refer to the self in terms of an individual subject with name, 
memories, and a biographical unified consciousness, there is 
nevertheless a primordial level of subjectivity beyond its narrative 
shaping, which Dennett calls a “biological self” (1991, 414), and 
Gallagher a “minimal self” (2000). This lower level provides just a 
minimal sense of ownership of the organism, and it is constituted by 
primordial feelings that don’t reach or require any linguistic expression. 
Similarly, Damasio cautions against the naïve equation of language 
with self-consciousness by saying that “the idea that self and 
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consciousness would emerge after language, and would be a direct 
construction of language, is not likely to be correct. Language does not 
come out of nothing” (1999, 108). For this reason, he invokes a more 
graduated scale of levels of subjectivity, by dividing the path through 
which the brain constructs a full-shaped self into three distinct stages: a 
“proto-self,” a “core self,” and an “autobiographical self.” The 
descriptive features of this repartition – which has not to be conflated 
with the well-known Freudian repartition of the psyche – should 
immediately recall to the seasoned reader of Beckett many narrative 
situations within his work.  
 The “protoself,” Damasio says, is “the spontaneous feeling of a 
living body” (2010, 181). At this stage, there is neither a ‘me’ nor an 
‘I,’ let alone the mastering of language. The “protoself” is the 
protagonist of our future story who still, as Damasio puts it, does not 
“protagonize” (202; emphasis in the original). Then, the “core self” 
arises thanks to the interaction between the “protoself” and the world. 
In this interaction, Damasio continues, the “protoself” is “raised and 
made to stand out” (202), called into life by phenomenal experience. 
There is not yet an ‘I’ here, but only a minimal sense of ownership of a 
spatial ‘here’ and a temporal ‘now.’ As a “core self,” I know the 
experience is happening to me now, even if I have no idea of who I am 
and what I did or what is in the past. The “core self” is a protagonist 
who ‘protagonizes’ without knowing who he is, for at this stage there is 
just “an unsolicited description of events, the brain indulging in asking 
questions that no one has posed” (204). The last stage is the 
“autobiographical self” when memories, biography, and a sense of 
personal coherence in the events appear. It is in this last phase that 
storytelling about our life could begin, where the centre of narrative 
gravity is established; after all, the narrative illusion of the self needs a 
material foundation.  
 This account of the gradual emergence of the self allows the 
potential description of different states of consciousness underlying the 
high-order activity through which the self is finally shaped as a 
narrative construct, is abstractedly posited as a narrative source. The 
lower grades of the model proposed by Damasio suggest that there is a 
biological unity, a perceptual centre beyond words, which only in its 
final stage is transformed (at the same time complicated, and 
simplified) into the conceptual coherence of a narrative self. Beckett 
himself refers to lower grades of perceptual unity ever since his essay 
on Proust. For example, in Proust he borrows from physics the same 
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metaphor employed by Dennett. Beckett uses it to describe the unity of 
perception that lies beyond any conceptual, narrative and intellectual 
coherence. These latter are criticized as rational forces, fighting to 
exclude every “discordant and frivolous intruder, whatever word or 
gesture, sound or perfume” which “cannot be fitted into the puzzle of a 
concept.” Beyond the self as a rational (and narrative) “vigilant” lies, 
Beckett says, the very “axis about which the sensation pivots, the centre 
of gravity of its coherence” (1999, 72). This precocious intuition took 
an entire career to be explored. Once at the “end of the jaunt,” Beckett 
had faced all the epistemological and ontological complication we have 
seen in this section, and Damasio’s model might shed light on the kind 
of creature lying beyond Beckett’s words.  
 
 
3. Towards the Seed of (Narrative) Motion: The Unnamable and 
Beyond 
It is time to reap the rewards of this survey into cognitive theories of 
the self by showing more closely how these accounts and problems 
chime with Beckett’s narrative investigation. With More Pricks than 
Kicks the cognitive journey, rather than beginning with a romantic 
quest for the self by experiencing the world, is directed towards escape 
of the self through constantly moving into the world. Belacqua calls 
these incessant displacements “gression” (significantly, Beckett chose 
the deponent Latin verb gredior for this coinage, whose original 
meaning was active in the meaning, but passive or middle in the form), 
or “moving pause,” that “constituted a break-down in the self-
sufficiency which he never wearied of arrogating to himself, a sorry 
collapse of my little internus homo.” As the doodle on the manuscript 
of The Unnamable attests, the idea of the self as an “internus homo” 
within the head has lasted almost thirty years in Beckett’s literary 
imagination. But if in The Unnamable the reader experiences from 
within the collapse of this architectural conception, in More Pricks than 
Kicks the collapse of the self is still executed through the silencing of 
its narrative activity. By incessantly moving on the horizontal surface 
of the world, Belacqua wants to attain or produce a “Beethoven pause” 
(32), accessing the “chasms of silence” (LSB I, 519) away from the 
inner storytelling activity the homunculus is voicing in the head. In a 
few words, what in The Unnamable will be a more direct inspection of 
the cognitive structure of self is at this early stage what we might 
characterize as an investigation pursued by distraction. 
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 Murphy constitutes a twist, a turning point after which the outward 
journey is redirected to the interior strata of the mind – a path of 
research that will lead, in the last volume of the trilogy, to the discovery 
of how the very idea of depth is deceptive. If Belacqua moves into the 
world to silence or make sleepy the chatter of what he perceives to be 
the little man inside his mind, it is instead the intruding frenzy of the 
world that Murphy wants to silence by tying himself to his beloved 
rocking chair. In so doing, Murphy technically improves the way to 
reach what in Dream of Fair to middling Women were for Belacqua 
rare fragile moments of the “chamber-work of sublimation,” in which – 
still within the spatial ‘box model’ of the mind – “the cylinders of his 
mind abode serene” (5). However, the inward turn of Murphy into his 
mind marks in Beckett’s fiction neither the end of the journey nor the 
achievement of silence. As the oxymoronic name of Mr. Endon in 
Murphy syncretizes, the withdrawal into the realm of the mind is the 
‘end’ of the outward traveling, but the activation (‘on’) of the vertical 
descent – after the shift of axis mentioned in the introduction. This turn 
follows Beckett’s understanding of what was the necessary journey to 
be undertaken (see also Nixon, 95-99). In a letter written in 1937, while 
commenting on the title of Walther Bauer’s novel Die notwendige 
Reise (Necessary Journey) Beckett clearly explained how, thinking 
about the quest for the self: 
 
Journey anyway is the wrong figure. How can one travel to that 
from which one cannot move away? Das notwendige Bleiben [The 
Necessary Staying Put] is more like it. […] The point is that the 
nosci te ipsum [know thyself] is no more mobile than the carpe te 
ipsum [gather thyself] of Murphy. The difference is that in the one 
motionless there is the seed of motion, and in the other not. 
(qtd. in Knowlson, 247) 
 
The figure of the horizontal journey to the self has to be substituted by 
“the figure of the bondage in the chair” (LSB I, 422), because it is in the 
motionlessness of the body that the inward journey can be initiated, a 
journey towards the seed of (narrative) motion from which it is 
ontologically impossible to move away (“within, motionless, I can live, 
and utter me,” (Beckett 2009, 319)). The investigation of the cognitive 
structure of self-knowledge requires a journey back to the source of the 
deception, narrating upstream (“Upstream, downstream, what matter” 
(346)) towards the centre of narrative gravity, where storytelling 
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begins. And this is why, from Murphy onwards, we rarely leave what in 
Murphy is described as a “mental chamber” (110), and in Molloy and 
Malone Dies becomes fictionalized writing rooms. 
 In The Unnamable every “mental chamber” disappears because, as 
the tempered protagonist of First Love says, “Such density of furniture 
defeats imagination” (39). For if we are to explore the functioning of 
the very engine of narrative imagination through which the self is 
established, the narration has to be brought beyond every imaginative 
figment, metaphorical rooms included. More complex narrative devices 
are required for investigating and generating in the reader the 
experience of the paradoxical ontology of the seed of motion. As 
Hoffman points out, in order to answer the long-lasting question of 
what a self is, Beckett “has applied a microscope to the fungi growing 
abundantly on the question mark” (73), but this microscope is made by 
the optical lens of narrative focalization. And in The Unnamable the 
reader is fictionally “recentered,” to use Ryan’s formula (22), into a 
very particular kind of focalizer, a first-person narrator who denies his 
own existence (“I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about 
me” (285)) and identity – a lack he ironically imagines to be reproached 
about (“come now, make an effort, at your age, to have no identity, it’s 
a scandal” (370)). Thanks to the freedom of fiction from logical 
constraints, Beckett could locate the narration directly at the centre of 
narrative gravity, voicing the ontological inexistence of its “unnatural 
storyworld” (Alber et al.) in which the categories of space and time are 
negated from the very beginning (“Where now? Who now? When 
now”? Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving.” (285)). Narratologically 
speaking, the features of this impossible Bachtinian chronotope 
apparently fit the characteristics of what Ann Banfield describes as an 
“empty centre”, since the reader faces “sentences with a deictic centre 
but without any explicit or implicit representation of an observer” 
(273). Nevertheless, despite the narrator of The Unnamable having the 
“very gaze of the missing observer, the very sensitivity of the 
instrument” whom Banfield attributes to the empty deictic centre (279), 
he also has a fundamental cognitive feature which Banfield’s concept 
does not encompass: that is, consciousness. The definition that Banfield 
gives of the empty deictic centre, in fact, is limited to the impersonal 
qualities of a narrative voice and does not take into account the strange 
case of a conscious impersonal voice (“For what I am doing is not 
being done without a minimum of mind” (305)). This is the ingenious 
formal solution Beckett employed in The Unnamable to investigate the 
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problem of self as centre of narrative gravity, making an empty deictic 
centre conscious of its emptiness.  
 First and foremost this centre is conscious of the empty deictic 
content of the first person pronoun it is forced to utilize, the illusion of 
existence being “the fault of pronouns, there is no name for me, no 
pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from that” (397). This trouble is 
the problem of a circular “autoepistemic closure” of self-knowledge we 
have seen in the previous section, where the explanandum is part of the 
explanans. Every reflective act of inspection of this unnatural focalizer 
will then raise circular impressions, forcing it to “sometimes wonder if 
the two retinae are not facing each other” (295). If the self is constituted 
by the story of which it is simultaneously the author – the narrator and 
their narrated protagonist – the only epistemic certainty that the self as 
the centre of this circular narration can reach is that “I’m in words, 
made of words, others’ words, what others, the place too, the air, the 
walls, the floor, the ceiling, all words” (379). As for the position he 
occupies within this world made of words, according to Dennett’s 
metaphor, the Unnamable says “I like to think I occupy the centre, but 
nothing is less certain” (289). What is left in question is who are “the 
others” of whose words the Unnamable claims to be made. A 
persuasive answer, I argue, can be found in the infinite regress problem 
of self-consciousness.  
 By placing the point of view of narration at the bottom (“Perhaps 
after all I am simply in the basement”; 312) of the storytelling flux 
(“I’ve the bloody flux”; 373), at the centre of self-spinning, and by 
making this centre a reflective pole towards its void, Beckett has 
created, as Levy effectively puts it, “a focal point of pointlessness” 
(11). Through this narrative device the voice firstly faces the 
explanatory circularity linked to the paradoxical nature of self-
consciousness. However, the voice obsessively mentions that above its 
position there are endless levels from which other voices constantly 
torment it. The narrator apostrophizes these voices, as for example “my 
troop of lunatics” (302), a “college of tyrants” (304), “maniacs” (320) 
and “my tormentors” (341). These voices, I suggest, can be interpreted 
as a fictionalization of the infinite regress bound to the high-order 
account of self-consciousness. If the self as a centre of narrative gravity 
cannot affirm its existence by itself due to an explanatory circularity, 
there should be something from above to testify and stabilize its 
ontological status. Yet another level would be needed to testify for this 
second order, and so on. To avoid infinite regress, this ontological pile 
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(“we’re piled up in heaps”, 374) should end in (and begin from) a final 
master of identity who, as the voice says, perhaps would “turn out to be 
a mere high official, we’d end up by needing God” (368). In short, as 
the narrator further complains elsewhere, in infinite regress “there 
might be a hundred of us and still we’d lack the hundred and first” 
(333). The infinite regress is perceived bottom up, from the inexistent 
point of view of the centre of narrative gravity, as a descendant 
vociferation inflating the centre of a consciousness and an identity it 
refuses to admit: “it’s entirely a matter of voices, no other metaphor is 
appropriate. They’ve blown me up with their voices, like a balloon” 
(319). Thus, after having defined himself as a “big talking ball” (299), a 
“living torch” (354) or “drying sperm” (373), the Unnamable defines 
his existence as an auditory effect, speaking of himself as “a pure ear” 
(347), whose existence is linked to the vociferation coming from the 
high-order regressive levels of consciousness. This is why “when they 
go silent, so do I” (361). These levels are whence the enigmatic 
(authorial, and authoritative) figures of Basil, or Mahood speak, trying 
to make the centre of narrative gravity believe in its autonomous 
existence and centrality as a self, but their trick “was clumsily done, 
you could see the ventriloquist” (342).  
 By voicing the seed of narrative motion in this “last confession” 
(404), Beckett collapses the architectural ‘box model’ of cognition from 
within. Even the feeling of falling into a “spiraling void” (Kenner, 61) 
finally proves to be erroneous. If something is falling in The 
Unnamable it is the deceptive scaffolding of language through which 
we are given the ontological illusion of depth. We have never been 
anywhere if not within language itself, there are no geological strata of 
the mind to penetrate, and this is why The Unnamable is what Beckett 
defines as “boundary work, passage work, in which as a result the old 
rubbish can still be some use, while the dying is going on” (LSB II, 
132). Narrative devices and metaphors are the “old rubbish” which 
have served the purpose of letting the reader experience the ontological 
inexistence of the centre of narrative gravity, the lack of depth of the 
mind and self, as well as the side effects of inquiring into the apparent 
transparency of self-knowledge. At the end of this delusive journey, 
after having explored every cognitive “gression” and “regression”, a 
passage (a “peephole” (350)) is finally opened to cast a glance beyond 
words. This peephole is created by an act of imagination of the 
narrative centre that after having successfully failed in bringing itself 
into perceptual existence can nevertheless imagine what kind of 
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creature and consciousness lies beyond its linguistic horizon. This 
“unthinkable ancestor of whom nothing can be said” (346) is called 
“Worm, the inexpugnable” (341), a creature whose features closely 
recall those of the “protoself” described by Damasio:  
 
Worm, to say he does not know what he is, where he is, what is 
happening, is to underestimate him. What he does not know is that 
there is anything to know. His senses tell him nothing, nothing 
about himself, nothing about the rest, and this distinction is 
beyond him. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, he exists 
nevertheless.  
(340) 
 
Worm, if we do not take too rigidly that “feeling nothing,” looks like 
the primordial self beyond and before the narrative articulation that will 
progressively bring him to the autobiographical stage. In order to enter 
this process, Damasio says, it “must be raised and made to stand out”, 
and then “it must connect with the events that it is involved in. Within 
the narrative of the moment, it must protagonize” (2010, 202, emphasis 
in the original). This is why the “tormentors” in The Unnamable (who 
consistently stand for higher levels of consciousness) want to “tear him 
from where he lies” by letting him have “his first experience of the 
vertical support” (350). Worm as the ‘protoself’ is a different kind of 
centre (“he is at the centre” (360)), ontologically and biologically 
subsisting, which “the purveyors” want to engage “through the various 
stages” into the cognitive “fatal concatenation,” the voice says, “which 
have made him what I am” (345). The centre of narrative gravity hopes 
that Worm could resist the temptation of language and of the 
phenomenal world, because “silence once broken will never again be 
whole” (385), and the ‘protoself’ as ontological unity will be 
transformed into a narrative abstraction.  
This cognitive reading offers a fresh interpretation of the last lines 
of the novel, when the voice says it has perhaps arrived “before the 
door that opens on my story” (407). By voicing its ontological absence 
and constituting itself as a linguistic boundary, the centre of narrative 
gravity simultaneously blows apart the impression of vertical depth and 
achieves consciousness of its evolution. Beyond the threshold of 
language it can now imagine its ontogenesis, the stages it passed 
through and the creatures it has been before becoming a narrative 
abstraction. What lies beyond the “impalpable fissure” (Hesla, 191) 
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opened by this cognitive rioting is not the nothing, but the primordial 
stages of self that the voice can finally imagine by locating itself, as 
Steven Connor claims, “between being and language” (5). In other 
words, the journey ends facing the rich unity of the organism before the 
ontological looting of language.  
 After the completion of The Unnamable, Beckett wrote that “there 
being nobody left to utter and, independently perhaps, certainly 
superfluously, nothing left to utter about” (LSB II, 319). If we take in 
this statement the term ‘nobody’ as indicating a fully-fledged self, a 
character with memories and mastery of language, then this concern, at 
least for Beckett’s prose after The Unnamable, will turn out to be valid. 
But if we consider the lower, non-verbal levels of subjectivity I have 
suggested that Beckett was already reflecting upon in the last novel of 
the trilogy, The Unnamable is thus not the end of Beckett’s narrative 
investigation into cognition, and Worm is possibly not the only creature 
to be related to Damasio’s graduation of self. Thirty years on from The 
Unnamable, another “transitional space” (Abbott 1996, 11) will be 
devised, in which another creature is presented as “being on the verge 
of being” (11), teased this time by the temptation of memories. The 
“one in the dark” of Company could in fact be interpreted as the middle 
stage, the “core self”, the intermediate creature standing in-between the 
deflated ‘autobiographical self’ and Worm as primordial ‘protoself’ we 
have seen in The Unnamable.  
In conclusion, although Beckett was not a philosopher, and 
certainly not a cognitive scientist, his literary investigation into 
cognition nonetheless achieved results that parallel scientific accounts. 
A cognitive approach to his narrative work – informed by narrative 
theory, extra-textual materials and textual analysis – can provide a 
framework for interpreting the extent to which Beckett was able to 
investigate the mind, generating through language and narrative devices 
experiences which the sciences can only discursively report. 
 
Notes 
 
I am deeply thankful to Porter Abbott for the enduring mentoring in my 
research on Beckett and cognition, and to David Tucker for his valuable 
comments on this article.   !
1. The special issue of the JOBS edited by Elizabeth Barry can be 
considered as the first extensive attempt to link Beckett’s work to cognitive 
sciences. This article entirely endorses Barry’s introductive statements about 
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!
the potentialities of a cognitive-oriented approach to the “abnormal linguistic 
usage in Beckett’s prose” (1).  !
2.  For a historical survey of the impact of Descartes on Beckett studies, and 
for a strong defense against this interpretive tendency see Feldman’s Beckett’s 
Books (39-57). 
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